This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network e¤ects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network e¤ects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. Clubs react to these network e¤ects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). The size of these network e¤ects also determines the level of competitive balance within the league. We further show that clubs bene…t from stronger combined network e¤ects through higher pro…ts and that network externalities can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance. Finally, we derive implications for improving competitive balance by taking advantage of network externalities.
Introduction
The professional team sports industry has a unique organizational structure. It is the only industry in which production is organized by leagues. This unique organizational structure is the result of the industry-speci…c production and competition process. Industry outsiders often tend to regard individual teams as …rms and treat them as production units. Unlike an automobile …rm, however, an individual team cannot produce a marketable product. Each team needs at least one opponent to play a match. However, even a match between two teams is not an attractive product. The individual matches must be upgraded by integrating them into an organized championship race. This upgrade, which gives each individual match additional value within the larger context of the championship race, is managed by the league.
From a sports perspective, each team within a league wants to win as many games as possible. Economically, however, teams are not so much competitors but are rather complementors. The quality or economic value of the championship race depends to a large extent on the level of competitive balance. Unlike Toyota and Ford, which prefer weak competitors in their industry, sports teams like Real Madrid, the New York Yankees, and the Dallas Cowboys bene…t from having strong opponents within their leagues. A more balanced league usually produces a more attractive -that is, economically more valuableproduct. 1 The clubs'competition provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides such as fans, advertisers and sponsors, the media, and merchandising companies. These interactions via an intermediary platform creates what is called a "multisided market." Each of the distinct market sides demands a speci…c good or service provided by the intermediary. Frequently, the market sides do not interact with each other directly; however, they exert network externalities on each other. These externalities in ‡uence the market's demand structure and the intermediary's pricing schemes.
Fans demand competition and the experience of a sports event, advertisers and sponsors demand an audience that they can inform about their products or services, the media demand an audience willing to pay for the use of their services, merchandising companies demand customers who want to buy their articles, etc. An interaction between two market sides only takes place because of the underlying sports event. Fans would hardly consume advertisement content if there were not a match taking place that featured their favorite team. Merchandising companies would sell many fewer fan articles if their products were not linked to an active sports team, and so on. These examples underline the importance of the clubs'competition to act as a platform for the di¤erent market sides that interact and exert network externalities on each other.
We add to the literature by contributing to two di¤erent strands of literature: on the one hand, the literature on multisided markets and on the other hand, the literature on analytical models of sports leagues. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to integrate the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model of a professional team sports league. Our model can then be used as a basic framework to analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent cross-subsidization schemes in team sports leagues.
In particular, this paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a two-stage contest model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network e¤ects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network e¤ects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. 2 Clubs react to these network externalities by charging lower prices to fans and, under certain conditions, higher prices to sponsors. Our analysis shows that the size of these network externalities determines the level of competitive balance within the league. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, competitive balance increases (small market potential) or decreases (large market potential) with stronger combined network e¤ects. Traditional models that do not take network externalities into account, thus under-or overestimate the actual level of competitive balance, which may lead to wrong policy implications. Moreover, we show that clubs ben-e…t from the presence of network externalities because club pro…ts increase with stronger combined network e¤ects.
The paper is of interest to policy-makers in a professional team sports league because we derive recommendations of how to improve competitive balance by taking advantage of network externalities. Our model suggests that an increase in the market potential of sponsors produces a more balanced league because the small club will increase its talent investments more than the large club in equilibrium. Finally, we show that network externalities can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. In Section 3, we present our model with its notation and main assumptions. We specify fan and sponsor demand, the quality of the competition and club pro…ts. In Section 4, we solve the two-stage game, derive the subgame-perfect equilibria and discuss the results. Section 5 highlights policy implications regarding competitive balance and revenue sharing. Finally, Section 6 points out possible extensions and concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Economists have designed various models of sports leagues. In an early contribution, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) developed a dynamic decision-making model of a professional sports league and incorporated certain fundamental features of the North American sports industry such as the reserve clause, player drafts and the sale of player contracts among teams. They show that revenue sharing does not in ‡uence competitive balance and thus con…rm the "invariance proposition". 3 Fort and Quirk (1995) derive similar results in an updated, static version of the El-Hodiri and Quirk model. Atkinson et al. (1988) contradict the invariance proposition and show that revenue sharing can improve competitive balance. In their model, Atkinson et al. adopt a pool-sharing arrangement and a club revenue function that depends on the team's performance and on the performance of all other teams. Their result is supported by Marburger (1997) , who builds his model on the assumption that fans care about the relative and absolute quality of teams. Vrooman (1995) shows that sharing the winning-elastic revenue does not a¤ect competitive balance, while sharing the winninginelastic revenue does improve competitive balance. Késenne (2000b) develops a two-team model consisting of a large-and a small-market club and shows that a payroll cap, de…ned as a …xed percentage of league revenue divided by the number of teams, will improve competitive balance as well as the distribution of player salary within the league (c.f. Késenne, 2007) .
The recent sports economics literature has suggested modeling a team sports league by making use of contest theory. 4 In his seminal article, Szymanski (2003) applied Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking contest to ascertain the optimal design of sports leagues. Based on a model of two pro…t-maximizing clubs and a club revenue function that depends on the relative quality of the home team, Szymanski and Késenne (2004) show that gate revenue sharing decreases competitive balance. This result is driven by the so-called "dulling e¤ect." The dulling e¤ect describes the well-known fact in sports economics that revenue sharing reduces the incentive to invest in playing talent. con…rm this …nding and further show that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare.
As this brief literature review shows, analytical models in sports are mainly focused on the e¤ect of cross-subsidization schemes such as reserve clauses, revenue sharing and salary caps on competitive balance without taking into account that the competition of the clubs provides the platform for the interaction of various market sides (fans, sponsors, advertisers and the media). These club-mediated interactions of di¤erent market sides create a "multisided market."
Research related to multisided markets is ‡ourishing and has been conducted on a broad range of topics and industries. For instance, software platforms (Evans et al., 2004) , payment systems (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 2003 Wright, , 2004 , the Internet (Baye and Morgan, 2001; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) and media markets (Crampes et al., 2009; Reisinger et al., 2009 ). More general models have been proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Armstrong (2006) , Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Belle ‡amme and Toulemonde (2009). Despite this large variety of applications, the theory of multisided markets has not yet been applied to sports leagues. This paper tries to …ll this gap.
Model Setup
We model a professional team sports league with two clubs, denoted as 1 and 2. The clubs are asymmetric with respect to their market size -that is, there is one large-market club and one small-market club. Each club i 2 f1; 2g invests independently a certain amount x i 2 R + 0 in playing talent to maximize its pro…ts. Talent is measured in perfectly divisible units that can be hired at a competitive labor market.
In our model, the competition of the clubs provides the platform that serves as the intermediary between two groups: fans and sponsors. Fans can consume sports competition by watching a match, while sponsors are attracted to the competition because sports events draw large crowds of potential customers and help to build a positive corporate image. The size of the crowd can then be leveraged through media coverage -an e¤ect that we model indirectly. The attractiveness of a sports event for sponsors increases with the number of fans watching. The presence of sponsors, in turn, may have a negative e¤ect on the attractiveness of the event for the fans. These indirect e¤ects are modeled as network externalities in the sponsor and fan demand functions.
The timing of the model features a two-stage structure:
1. Stage: Clubs invest independently in playing talent with the objective of maximizing their own pro…ts. Talent investments determine the win percentages and thus the quality of the competition of the two clubs.
Stage:
Given a certain quality of competition, fans and sponsors make their decisions taking into account the network externalities that operate from one market side to the other. Each club then generates its own revenues dependent on the decisions of fans and sponsors.
In the sections that follow we derive the demand functions of fans and sponsors under network externalities and specify the quality of the competition. Finally, we derive club revenues, costs and pro…ts.
Demand of fans and sponsors under network externalities
We assume that the fans of club i 2 f1; 2g demand the quantity q f i 2 R + 0 given by 5
while the amount of advertising q s i 2 R + 0 that sponsors place at club i 2 f1; 2g is given by 6
The price fans have to pay to be able to watch a match, is denoted by p f i 2 R + 0 , while p s i 2 R + 0 stands for the price sponsors have to pay for advertisements. Clubs can charge fans for watching the match by selling tickets and also, indirectly, by collectively or individually selling media rights. Through ticket sales, clubs directly generate revenues from fan attendance. Through media rights sales, clubs indirectly generate revenues from fans by the sale of the rights to a broadcasting company, which in turn charges its viewers for the broadcast. In a …rst approach, our model includes the media indirectly as a lever for higher fan attendance. In further research, the media sector could be modeled as a third market side.
The parameter m f i 2 R + characterizes the market size of club i. Without loss of generality, we assume that club 1 is the large-market club, with a higher drawing potential, and as a result, a bigger fan base than the small-market club 2, such that m f 1 > m f 2 . Furthermore, the parameter m s 2 R + represents the total market potential of the sponsors, or, in the case of a binding quota for sponsoring de…ned by the league, the sponsors'bounded market potential. 7 The network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market are referred to as "fan-related network externalities" and are denoted by n f 2 [0; 1). We assume that the fan-related network externalities are positive because more fans imply more publicity and thus have a positive e¤ect on the demand in the sponsor market. On the other hand, the network externalities that operate from the sponsor market to the fan market are referred to as "sponsor-related network externalities" and are denoted by n s 2 ( 1; 1). Thus, we allow for positive or negative sponsor-related network externalities. However, we assume that the positive fan-related network externalities are at least as strong as the sponsor-related network externalities in absolute values, i.e., n f jn s j. The possibly positive (even though small) e¤ect of advertising on consumers (see, e.g., Nelson, 1974 and Kotowitz and Mathewson, 1979) reduces the negative sponsor-related network externalities such that the assumption n f jn s j is reasonable. 8 In general, network externalities can be illustrated by a displacement of the demand functions q f i and q s i . In this respect, stronger network externalities induce stronger displacement of the corresponding demand functions. The combined network e¤ects from fans and sponsors, denoted by are given by n f + n s . A higher n f implies that the positive fanrelated network externalities are relatively more important than the sponsor-related network externalities, such that the combined network e¤ects increase. Similarly, a higher n s (i.e., either weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network externalities) results in stronger combined network e¤ects. By assuming that n f jn s j the combined network e¤ects are not smaller than zero -i.e., 2 [0; 2). Consequently, > 0 describes a situation with positive combined network e¤ects in which the positive fan-related network externalities are stronger than the sponsor-related network externalities in absolute values. If = 0 then the combined network e¤ects equal zero. In this case, we have either a situation without network externalities (i.e., n f = n s = 0) or a situation with equalized network externalities in which both individual network externalities are equal in terms of absolute values (i.e., n f = n s ).
Finally, the parameter i 2 R + denotes the quality of the competition between club i against club j and is speci…ed below by equation (5). We assume that a higher quality of the 7 Note that the parameter m s has no subscript, because we assume that there is only one homogeneous group of sponsors in the league o¤ering advertisements to the two types of clubs. The introduction of a club-speci…c sponsor with market potential m s i at club i would not change the results qualitatively. Moreover, under a quota on sponsoring one can imagine restrictions on where advertisements may be placed or on the speci…c types of companies that are allowed to appear as sponsors in a league. 8 A potentially negative externality derived from advertisements could be that fans want to watch sports events, not advertisements. In the case where the actual sports event is adapted to commercial requirements, e.g., special advertisement breaks, this aspect becomes even more obvious. For further discussion of this aspect, see Becker and Murphy (1993) , Depken and Wilson (2004) and Reisinger et al. (2009). the event (competition of the clubs) has a positive e¤ect on fan demand, but at the same time, it has also a positive impact on sponsor demand (i.e., @q s
: there is a positive e¤ect @q f i =@ i > 0 through more fans and a positive leverage e¤ect p s i = 2 i > 0, because a high quality event draws a larger audience. The media serve as an additional lever, increasing sponsors'exposure to consumers. Consequently, sponsors'demand increases through a higher quality via more media exposure (Borland and MacDonald, 2003 and Farrelly and Quester, 2003) .
The quality of the competition
Following and Dietl et al. (2009) , we assume that the quality of the competition i depends on two factors: the probability of club i's success and the uncertainty of outcome. Furthermore, we assume that both factors enter the quality function as a linear combination with equal weights, that is, the quality of the competition is represented by the combination of the win percentage and the uncertainty of outcome. 9 We measure the probability of club i's success by the win percentage w i of this club. The win percentage is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF), which maps the vector (x i ; x j ) of talent investment into probabilities for each club. We apply the logit approach, which is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests, and de…ne the win percentage w i of club i as 10
where x i 0 characterizes the talent investments of club i = f1; 2g. We de…ne w i (x i ; x j ) :=
1=2 if x i = x j = 0. Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the adding-up constraint: w j = 1 w i with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. Following Szymanski (2004), we adopt the "Contest-Nash conjectures" and compute the derivative of equation (3) as
The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the league. Following Szymanski (2003) , , and Vrooman (2008), we specify competitive 9 We will see below that this speci…cation of the quality function gives rise to a quadratic revenue function widely used in the sports economic literature. 10 The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) . It was subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) . An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) , the di¤erence-form CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989) and the value weighted CSF (Runkel, 2006) . See Dietl, Franck and Lang (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for analyses concerning the e¤ect of the discriminatory power in the CSF. 11 See Szymanski (2004) .
balance CB by the product of the win percentages, i.e.,
(4) with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. Note that competitive balance attains its maximum of 1=4 for a completely balanced league in which both clubs invest the same amount in talent such that w 1 = w 2 = 1=2. A less balanced league is then characterized by a lower value of CB.
With the speci…cation of the win percentage given by equation (3) and competitive balance given by equation (4), club i's quality function i as described above is derived as
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. A higher win percentage w i of club i induces the quality of the competition i to increase, albeit with a decreasing rate, which re ‡ects the impact of competitive balance on the quality of the competition, i.e., @ i =@w i > 0 and @ 2 i =@w 2 i < 0. 12
Derivation of club revenues, costs and pro…ts
Each club generates its own revenues such that total revenue R i of club i is given by the sum of fan-related revenue p f i q f i and sponsor-related revenue p s i q s i :
This club-speci…c revenue function, which is quadratic in the win percentage, is widely used in the sports economics literature. For instance, our revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , p. 1164 . Moreover, note that club i's revenues increase with the quality of the competition i . By assuming a competitive labor market and following the sports economic literature, the market clearing cost of a unit of talent, denoted by c, is the same for every club. The cost function of club i 2 f1; 2g is thus given by C(
The pro…t function of club i is then given by revenues minus costs and yields
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j.
Equilibrium Analysis
In the …rst stage, clubs decide on their investments in playing talent, considering the cost of talent and its e¤ect on their win percentage. In the second stage, given the quality of the competition as determined in stage 1, fans and sponsors make their decisions taking into account the network externalities. We apply backward induction to solve for the subgameperfect equilibria in this two-stage game.
Stage 2
In this subsection, we characterize the point at which the pricing for fans and sponsors under network externalities is optimal such that clubs obtain maximum revenue. Clubs will take into account the relatedness of the fan and sponsor market and thus consider the consequences of the two distinct network externalities on the pricing decisions and demand functions. Formally, club i = f1; 2g maximizes its revenue R i = p f i q f i + p s i q s i in stage 2 by taking the investment decisions made in stage 1 as given. Note that we assume that marginal costs for sponsors and fans are zero. The equilibrium in prices and quantities in stage 2 is derived in the next lemma:
Lemma 1 In stage 2, equilibrium prices and quantities for fans and sponsors of club i = f1; 2g are given by
Proof. See Appendix A.1. In equilibrium, fans will demand the quantity represented by b q f i and are willing to pay the price represented by b p f i . Correspondingly, the sponsors will demand b q s i and pay b p s i for each unit of advertisement in equilibrium. 13 In order to build the intuition, we consider a scenario in which the sponsors and the fans of club i have symmetric market potential -i.e., m s = m f i = m i > 0. In this scenario, 13 Note that if the market potential of the sponsors is larger than that of the fans of club i, i.e., m s > m f i , we must bound m s from above such that m s < m s
equilibrium prices and quantities for sponsors and fans of club i = f1; 2g are given by
Note that due to the symmetry of the two markets, sponsors and fans of club i demand an equal quantity b q f i = b q s i in equilibrium. We derive that stronger combined network e¤ects yield higher quantities for both fans and sponsors in equilibrium. This follows because an increase in n s (i.e., either weaker negative or stronger positive sponsor-related network externalities) yields increased combined network e¤ects and thus leads to an increase in the demand of fans. In combination with the positive fan-related network externalities, this induces an increase in demand on the part of sponsors. In contrast to the equilibrium quantities, the equilibrium prices di¤er between fans and sponsors. Sponsors pay a higher price in equilibrium than do fans -i.e., b p s i > b p f i for all n f > jn s j. Note that the price b p f i for fans (b p s i for sponsors) is lower (higher), the stronger are the positive fan-related network externalities n f , whereas the price b p f i for fans (b p s i for sponsors) is lower (higher), the lower is n s .
Comparative statics for the general case with asymmetric market potential of fans and sponsors lead to the following proposition:
Lemma 2 (i) Equilibrium quantities for fans and sponsors of club i increase with n f and n s , i.e., @b q i =@n f > 0 and @b q i =@n s > 0 for 2 ff; sg. (ii) Given a certain quality of the competition i equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with stronger fan-related network externalities, i.e., @ b
p
Proof. See Appendix A.2. Part (i) of the lemma shows that the stronger are the positive fan-related network externalities n f , the higher is the equilibrium quantity demanded by fans and sponsors. If there is a disutility of the sponsors'advertisements for fans (n s < 0), then the equilibrium quantities demanded by fans and sponsors decrease with stronger, i.e., more negative sponsor-related network externalities. If, on the other hand, n s > 0, then the equilibrium quantities demanded by fans and sponsors increase with stronger, i.e., more positive sponsor-related network externalities.
It follows that the equilibrium demands b q s i and b q f i are higher in a situation in which the combined network e¤ects are positive than in a situation in which the combined network e¤ects are zero. The intuition is as in the case with symmetric market potential above. Ceteris paribus, an increase in n s leads to an increase in fan demand and consequently, due to positive fan-related network externalities, to an increase in the demand of the sponsors.
Note that fans of club i demand a higher quantity in equilibrium if their market potential is larger than that of the sponsors, i.e., b
ii) of the lemma shows that given a certain quality of the competition i the equilibrium price b p f i for the fans of club i is lower, the stronger are the positive fan-related network externalities n f , whereas the opposite holds true for the equilibrium price b p s i for the sponsors. This result is in accordance with the special case of symmetric market potentials. Relatively stronger fan-related network externalities induce an increase in the demand function of the sponsors and yield, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the prices for sponsors. Thus, if club i decreases the price for the market with the stronger positive network externalities (in our model the fan market), it enhances the positive e¤ect on revenues. It follows that due to the positive network externalities exerted by the fans on the sponsors, a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep prices low on the market with the positive network externalities, whereas in the market with relatively weaker positive or even negative network externalities (the sponsor market), it has an incentive to charge higher prices.
Whether the equilibrium price for fans is higher than that for the sponsors depends on the relationship between the market potential of fans and sponsors and the particular network externalities. Formally, we derive b
Thus, as long as the market potential of the fans relative to that of the sponsors is smaller than (1 n s ) = 1 n f , prices are higher in the sponsor market than in the fan market. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the fan-related network externalities renders the fan market less important (due to its weaker network externalities) and the right-hand side of the inequality decreases such that the inequality may not be satis…ed anymore. In this case, equilibrium prices on the fan market may be higher than on the sponsor market. Note that if the market potential of the sponsor market is higher than the market potential of the fan market for club i (i.e. m s > m f i ) then independent of the network externalities, prices will be higher in the sponsor market because (1 n s ) = 1 n f > 1 for all 1 > n f > jn s j 0.
Furthermore, we derive from (8) and (9) that in a situation without network externalities (i.e., n f = n s = 0), club i maximizes its revenue by making the quantity sold to fans directly proportional to the quantity sold to sponsors with b q f i = (m f i =m s )b q s i . 14 Finally, we see that equilibrium prices for fans (sponsors) are lower (higher) in a situation with positive combined network e¤ects than in a situation in which combined network e¤ects equal zero. 14 Note that this relationship holds true also in a situation in which combined network e¤ects are zero.
By substituting equilibrium prices and quantities of fans and sponsors from (8) and (9) in the revenue function (6), we compute the revenue of club i as 15
In the next lemma, we derive some useful properties of the function i which will be exploited in the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 3 We consider i ( ) as a function of the combined network externalities and derive the following properties: 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) and @ 1 ( )=@ > @ 2 ( )=@ > 0.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted. It follows from Lemma 3 that given a certain quality of competition equal for both clubs -i.e., 1 = 2 -the revenue of the large club will be higher than the revenue of the small club. Moreover, revenues for both types of clubs increase with stronger combined network e¤ects, where the increase is stronger for the large club than for the small club.
Stage 1
In stage 1, club i maximizes its pro…ts by anticipating the decisions made in stage 2. By substituting club revenues (10) into the pro…t function (7), we derive the maximization problem of club i = f1; 2g in stage 1 as max
The …rst-order conditions for this maximization problem yield 16
15 The revenue function given by (10) satis…es the properties of the revenue function proposed by Szymanski and Késenne (2004, p. 168) . 16 It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satis…ed.
Solving this system of equations, yields the equilibrium talent investments of clubs i = f1; 2g in stage 1 as b
and i; j = f1; 2g; i 6 = j. Both types of clubs invest a positive amount b
x i > 0 in playing talent. Moreover, the large club invests more in talent than does the small club (i.e., b
x 1 > b
x 2 ) because the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for the former type of club due to the larger market potential of its fans. 17 Note that the investments of both clubs are in ‡uenced by the network externalities exerted by fans and sponsors. Again, the extent to which fans and sponsors indirectly in ‡uence each other determines the decision of each club to invest in playing talent.
Substituting the equilibrium investments (13) in the CSF function (3) yields the following equilibrium win percentages:
By analyzing the impact of network externalities on the win percentages, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Stronger combined network e¤ects induce the large (small) club to decrease (increase) its win percentage in equilibrium and thus produce a more balanced league if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small. Formally, @ b
Proof. See Appendix A.5. The proposition shows that with a su¢ ciently small market potential of the sponsors, the win percentage of the large (small) club is lower (higher), the stronger the positive network externalities that operate from fans to sponsors are. A lower disutility or a higher utility of the sponsors'advertisements for the fans yields the same result. The intuition behind this proposition follows: The di¤erence in market sizes for the two clubs regarding their fan base yields that sponsor-related revenues are relatively more important to the small club than to the large club. To attract sponsors, the small-market club increases its investment in talent as combined network e¤ects increase, thereby increasing its win percentage. The potentially negative impact of more sponsors on the attractiveness of the match to the fans is less important to the small club. For the large-market club, the opposite rationale holds. Fan-related revenues are relatively more important because of the larger market size. In equilibrium, it is optimal for the large-market club to invest less in talent, as the revenue impact of less sponsors overcompensates the potentially decreasing attractiveness of the match to the fans. Consequently, with stronger combined network externalities competitive balance increases. Thus, a league in which the positive fan-related network externalities are stronger than the sponsor-related network externalities (in absolute value) may be characterized by a higher degree of competitive balance than a league in which combined network e¤ects are zero. For a su¢ ciently large market potential of the sponsors, the opposite holds true. In this case, competitive balance decreases when combined network e¤ects increase.
Furthermore note that the quality of the competition b i in equilibrium can be expressed in
A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that stronger network e¤ects imply a lower (higher) quality of competition for the large (small) club if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small. Formally,
The impact of network externalities on club pro…ts is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Stronger combined network e¤ects yield an increase in pro…ts for the small and the large club.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The proposition shows that the pro…ts of the small and the large club increase if the positive network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market increase (or equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsors' advertisements on the fans). Thus, the two types of clubs bene…t from stronger network e¤ects. To see the intuition behind this result, remember that the pro…ts of club i in equilibrium are given by b i = i b i cb x i , and thus, the partial derivatives with respect to combined network e¤ects
Through stronger combined network e¤ects, both types of clubs face higher costs due to a higher investment level in playing talent. On the other hand, stronger combined network e¤ects have a positive e¤ect on equilibrium quantities (b q f i ; b q s i ) and prices (b p f i ; b p s i ) such that club revenues for both types of clubs increase. The higher club revenues compensate for the higher costs, and thus, club pro…ts increase. Note that the positive e¤ect on club revenues due to stronger combined network e¤ects holds true even though the quality of the competition b i will decrease for the large (small) club if the market potential m s of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small (large).
Further Implications and Discussion

Competitive balance and network externalities
Research on competitive balance has not considered the in ‡uence of network e¤ects so far, i.e., the parameter has been assumed to be zero. By integrating the existence of network e¤ects into models of sports leagues, new policy measures for leagues and their governing bodies emerge. For example, Proposition 1 suggests that network externalities potentially a¤ect competitive balance when there is a limit on sponsoring activities. In particular, if sponsors only dispose of a limited quota for advertisements m s < b m s , competitive balance increases through stronger network externalities that operate from fans to sponsors (or equivalently, through a weaker impact by sponsors'advertisements on the fans).
The league and its clubs cannot manipulate the strength of the network externalities. However, by controlling the market potential of the sponsors, they can make sure that the network externalities operate in the desired direction. The market potential of the sponsors is thus a crucial parameter to control the competitive balance in our league model. This result will be emphasized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Competition in the league becomes more balanced when the market potential m s of the sponsors increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The proposition shows that a possible measure for improving competitive balance is to increase the market potential of the sponsors. For this to hold, however, the market potential of the sponsors has to remain below the threshold given in Proposition 1, i.e., m s < b m s . Otherwise, stronger network e¤ects would have a negative impact on the competitive balance in the league, and thus mitigate the positive e¤ect of an increased m s . An increase in the market potential of the sponsors could be achieved, for instance, through an increase in the quota for the amount of advertisements set by the league.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 3 is that clubs generate revenues from fans and sponsors, where the amount of sponsorship revenues also depends on the amount of fans a¢ liated with a certain club (see Lemma 1). In equilibrium, the revenues generated from the sponsors'advertisements are higher for the large club than for the small club due to the larger market potential from the fans of the large club. An increase in the quota for the amount of advertising for the sponsors increases both clubs'revenues. Due to the decreasing returns to scale of sponsors' advertising, the increase in revenues, however, is stronger for the small club than for the large club. It follows that the incentives to invest in playing talent are higher for the small club than for the large club. This relative di¤erence causes the former type of club to increase its equilibrium talent investments more than the latter type of club. As a result, the win percentage of the large (small) club decreases (increases) and a more balanced league emerges.
Revenue sharing and network externalities
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of revenue sharing in the presence of network externalities. The sharing of revenues plays an important role in the redistribution of revenues and has long been accepted as an exemption from antitrust law. 19 The basic idea of such a cross-subsidization policy is to guarantee a reasonable competitive balance in the league by redistributing revenues from large-market clubs to small-market clubs because large-market clubs have a higher revenue-generating potential than do small-market clubs (Atkinson et al., 1988; Késenne, 2000, Szymanski and Késenne, 2004; Dietl, Lang and Rathke, 2010) . The current revenue-sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all over the world. The most prominent is possibly that operated by the National Football League (NFL), in which the visiting club receives 40% of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue. Major League Baseball (MLB) has a revenue-sharing agreement whereby all the clubs in the American League put 34% of their locally generated revenue (gate, concessions, television, etc.) into a central pool, which is then divided equally among all the clubs.
We introduce a pool revenue-sharing arrangement into our model. Under a pool-sharing arrangement, club i receives an -share of its revenue R i and an (1 )=2-share of a league revenue pool R i + R j . The after-sharing revenues of club i, denoted by R i , can be written as:
with 2 (0; 1] and i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6 = j. Note that a higher parameter represents a league with a lower degree of redistribution. Thus, the limiting case of = 1 describes a league without revenue-sharing. The maximization problem of club i is thus given by max
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. By solving this maximization and analyzing the e¤ect of on the equilibrium win percentages, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In the presence of network externalities, revenue sharing always decreases the competitive balance in the league. Network externalities, however, mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if the market potential m s of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small with m s < b m s .
Proof. See Appendix A.8. In accordance to other contest models of sports leagues with pro…t-maximizing clubs (e.g., Szymanski and Késenne, 2004; Grossmann, Dietl and Lang, 2010) , the proposition shows that revenue sharing produces a less balanced competition in a league in which positive network externalities operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while negative network externalities operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. A higher degree of revenue sharing, i.e., a lower parameter , results in a higher win percentage for the large club and a lower win percentage for the small club.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Revenue sharing has a negative e¤ect on marginal revenue of both clubs in equilibrium. This so-called "dulling e¤ect" is more pronounced for the underdog (small-market club) than for the dominant team (large-market club). Due to the logit formulation of the CSF, the (positive) marginal impact on the dominant team's revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the underdog is greater than the (positive) marginal impact on the underdog's revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the dominant team. As a result, the small club will reduce its investment level relatively more than the large club such that the league becomes less balanced through revenue sharing.
Network externalities, however, can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance. In particular, if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small such that m s < b m s then stronger combined network e¤ects reduce the di¤erences between clubs in terms of win percentages and thus reduce the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance. In the opposite case, i.e., m s > b m s , network externalities even reinforce the dulling e¤ect such that the negative impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance augments.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a contest model of a professional team sports league with two market sides. The competition of the clubs is the platform between fans on one market side and sponsors on the other market side. Positive network externalities operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, and ambiguous network externalities operate from the sponsor market to the fan market.
Our analysis shows that a revenue-maximizing club has an incentive to keep prices low in the market with relatively stronger positive network externalities and charge a higher price in a market with relatively weaker positive or negative network externalities. In our model, low prices on the fan market enhance the positive e¤ect on club revenues due to the positive network externalities that operate from the fan market to the sponsor market. An increase in the demand in the fan market leads (through positive fan-related network externalities) to an increase in the demand on the sponsor market. High prices in the market with positive network externalities would inhibit the positive e¤ect on club revenues.
We further derive that network externalities may crucially a¤ect competitive balance in a sports league. In particular, we show that stronger combined network e¤ects induce both clubs to increase their talent investments in equilibrium. If the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small, the increase in talent investments of the small club will be stronger than that of the large club because the small club bene…ts more from stronger network e¤ects than the large club. As a result, the win percentage of the small club increases and the win percentage of the large club decreases in equilibrium, yielding a more balanced league. With the introduction of a revenue sharing arrangement, our model shows that network externalities can mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance.
We conclude that it is important to incorporate network externalities into the analysis of team sports leagues. Depending on the market potential of the sponsors, traditional analyses of sports leagues that do not take network externalities into account may under-or overestimate the actual level of competitive balance in a league. Based on these predictions, traditional analyses may therefore suggest the wrong policy implications. For instance, they may suggest the implementation of measures to increase competitive balance, which may not be necessary because the league may already be su¢ ciently balanced. Finally, our model suggests that both types of clubs bene…t from the presence of network externalities because club pro…ts always increase with stronger combined network e¤ects. This result holds true even though costs increase for both types of clubs due to higher talent investments. The higher club revenues, however, compensate for the higher costs, such that club pro…ts always increase.
Taking a closer look at major team sports leagues worldwide, one can …nd a number of phenomena that may be explained by our model. For example, the di¤erences in match attendance and average ticket prices between national leagues in European football are accompanied by strong divergences in sponsor-related revenues. While match-day income (e.g., ticket sales and the like) makes up a higher percentage of revenues in the English Premier League than in the German Bundesliga, sponsorship is far more important in the latter. This fact may mirror the trade-o¤ between fan-related and sponsor-related revenues. The quota for sponsorship in many North American major leagues represents another example; even though teams might be able to obtain higher revenues by increasing the amount of sponsoring/advertisements, the majority of teams refrains from posting advertisements on jerseys. 20 Our model serves as a basic framework for the analysis of network e¤ects in team sports leagues. There is a broad range of further applications and model extensions. For instance, an interesting avenue for further research could be the application of our model to a league that operates with restrictions (caps and ‡oors) on player salaries. Payroll restrictions to improve competitive balance and control costs are common in professional team sports leagues all around the world. The implementation of such payroll restrictions in the model with network externalities could yield further implications for the governance of team sports leagues.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In stage 2, club i 2 f1; 2g maximizes its revenue R i = p f i q f i + p s i q s i , by taking the investment decisions made in stage 1 as given. Formally, club i solves the following maximization problem: 21
The reaction functions of fans and sponsors are derived as
Note that there is a positive relationship between the quantities demanded by sponsors and fans in equilibrium because if the combined network e¤ects are positive, i.e., n f + n s > 0.
Solving this system of reaction functions, yields the following equilibrium quantities for for all m f i > 0, m s > 0, 1 > n f jn s j 0 and 2 [0; 2). (ii) In order to show that, given a certain quality of the competition i , equilibrium prices b p f i for fans (b p s i for sponsors) of club i decrease (increase) with stronger fan-related network e¤ects, we compute
for all m f i > 0, m s > 0, 1 > n f jn s j 0 and 2 [0; 2). This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that stronger network e¤ects induce the large (small) club to decrease (increase) its win percentage in equilibrium if and only if the market potential of the sponsors is su¢ ciently small, we proceed as follows. We write @ i ( ) @ = 0 i ( ). According to Lemma 3, we know that 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) and 0
With i ( ) given by (11), it holds
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
For expositional sake, we provide a formal proof for a linear revenue function. The proof for a quadratic revenue function is mathematically equivalent but notational very cumbersome. We therefore stick to the case of linear revenues. In case of linear revenues, the pro…t function of club i is given by i = i w i x i , such that the equilibrium investments b x i and win percentages b w i yield (b x 1 ; b
x 2 ) = 2 1 2
( 1 + 2 ) 2 ; 1 2 2
( 1 + 2 ) 2 and ( b w 1 ; b w 2 ) = 1 1 + 2 ; 2 1 + 2 :
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Equilibrium pro…ts b i of club i are thus computed as b i = 2 i 1 + 2 : The derivative with respect to network e¤ects is given by @b i @ = i ( ) ( i ( ) + 2 j ( )) 0 i ( ) i ( ) 0 j ( ) ( i ( ) + j ( )) 2 :
We derive @b 1 @ > 0 , 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) and 0 1 ( ) > 0 2 ( ) > 0, whereas @b 2 @ > 0 , 2 1 ( )+ 2 ( ) 2 ( ) > 0 1 ( ) 0 2 ( ) . However, one can show that the last inequality is always ful…lled for i given by (11), in combination with m f 1 > m f 2 > 0, m s > 0 and 2 [0; 2). This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that a larger market potential m s of the sponsors increases the competitive balance in the league, we proceed as follows. We consider i (m s ) = for all m f 1 > m f 2 > 0; m s > 0 and 2 [0; 2). We know that competitive balance can be expressed in terms of i (m s ) as b w 1 b w 2 = 1 (m s ) [ 1 (m s ) 2 (m s )] 1=2 > 1. Now, we will show that @( b w 1 = b w 2 ) @m s < 0 and thus @ b w 1 @m s < 0 and @ b w 2 @m s > 0: We conclude that competitive balance increases with a larger market potential of the sponsors, i.e., @( b
w 2 ) @m s < 0. This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The …rst-order conditions of the maximization problem (15) are derived as
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satis…ed. By combining the …rst-order conditions of club i and j, and using the adding-up constraint @w i @x i = @w j @x i , we obtain
with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. By using (3) and (10), and after some rearrangements, we …nd that in equilibrium (b x 1 ; b
x 2 ) it must hold b
x 1 = (1 )( 1 2 ) + [(1 ) 2 ( 2 1 + 2 2 ) + 2 1 2 (1 + (6 + )] 1=2 2(1 + ) 2 b x 2 ; with i given by (11) and i 2 f1; 2g. It follows that the equilibrium win percentage of club i is given by b w i = i (1 + 3 ) + j (1 ) [(1 ) 2 ( 2 1 + 2 2 ) + 2 1 2 (1 + (6 + )] 1=2 4 ( i j )
; with i given by (11) and i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6 = j. We further compute the partial derivative of b w 1 with respect to at = 1 as @ b w 1 @ =1 = 1 + 2 2 p 1 2 4( 1 2 ) < 0, because 1 > 2 . We conclude that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower ) increases the win percentage of the large-market club 1 and consequently decreases the win percentage of the small-market club 2. As a result, competitive balance decreases which proves part (i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii), we proceed as follows. We de…ne F ( ) as the partial derivative of b w 1 with respect to at = 1, i.e., F ( ) := 1 ( )+ 2 ( ) 2 p 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 4( 1 ( ) 2 ( ))
, and we show
As we know from the proof of Proposition 1, the last inequality is satis…ed if and only if m s < b m s . We conclude that stronger combined network e¤ects mitigate the negative e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance if and only if m s < b m s . Note that numerical simulations have shown that parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition hold for all parameters 2 (0; 1].
